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Deliberative Democracy in
Severely Fractured Societies
ADENO ADDIS*
ABSTRACT
The world is full of boundaries. Whatever their nature, boundaries provide the con-
ditions for communal or individual identity and agency, and they make collective action
possible. That very capacity to define and contain, however, allows boundaries to "close
offpossibilities of being that might otherwise flourish." Paradoxically, boundaries "both
foster and inhibit freedom." This article explores how one particular boundary-ethnic-
ity-has served both as an important source of identity and a cause of deep fracture in
societies that this article calls "severely fractured." The purpose of the article is to explore
what institutional structures and processes might be appropriate to respond to the chal-
lenges that severely fractured societies face. After examining the two well-known ap-
proaches-consociation and integration-that have dominated studies of, and
prescriptions for, severely fractured societies, the article concludes that each unwisely un-
deremphasizes one or another of the two necessary conditions for long-term stability in
these societies: institutions that are both highly inclusive and have the capacity to foster
interethnic dialogue. The article then outlines and defends a version of deliberative de-
mocracy that it argues responds to the needs of inclusion (pluralism) and the cultivation
of interethnic dialogue. A well-structured deliberative process in the context of a highly
inclusive institutional environment has the best prospect oftransforming the hard param-
eters of ethnic identity into the soft parameters of diversity that this article argues will lead
to a more sustainable form ofpluralistic solidarity.
* William Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law, Tulane University Law
School. For helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, thanks go to Marjorie Kornhauser,
Jonathan Nash, Keith Werhan, and participants at the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
Symposium on Operationalizing Global Governance which was held on March 19-21, 2008 at the
Indiana University Maurer School of Law - Bloomington. This article is a revised version of the
paper presented at that conference.
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INTRODUCTION
The world is full of boundaries. There are boundaries that are marked by
geography, by ethnicity, by race, by gender, and the like. Whatever their nature,
boundaries provide the condition for communal or individual identity and agency,
and they make collective action possible. That very capacity to define and contain,
however, allows boundaries to "close off possibilities of being that might other-
wise flourish."' This is the paradox of boundaries that led one scholar to remark
that "[b]oundaries both foster and inhibit freedom."2
This article will focus on one particular boundary that has been both an im-
portant source of identity and a cause of deep division in many states: ethnicity.3
The article explores the following question: what institutional structures are ap-
propriate for societies that are severely fractured along ethnic lines?4 The issue of
how severely divided societies should cope with the challenges they face is of the
highest practical importance and presents a significant conceptual challenge.
It is often said that the long-term stability and viability of severely fractured
societies depend on their adoption of democratic institutions. Perhaps that is true.
However, as Donald Horowitz observes, democracy defined as majoritarian rule
is often a problem rather than a solution to the extent that it may (and often does)
lead to the perpetual domination of one ethnic group by another.5 Long term sta-
1. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE ETHICS OF PLURALIZATION 163 (1995).
2. Id.
3. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT, at xi (1985) ("The importance of
ethnic conflict... as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be denied .... Ethnicity is at the center
of politics in country after country, a potent source of challenge to the cohesion of states and of inter-
national tension."). By "ethnicity" I mean to include racial, linguistic, and national differences as well.
This is a view that the well-known Israeli Africanist Naomi Chazan expressed quite well when she
observed that "[slometimes ethnic solidarity was expressed in cultural and linguistic terms. At other
times ethnicity was presented in regional or geographic terms. And at still other points, ethnicity was
manifested in local-communal-traditional political, territorial, or kin-terms." Naomi Chazan,
Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana, 97 POL. ScI. Q. 461, 467 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
4. For a definition of "severely fractured societies," see discussion infra Part II.
5. Donald L. Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, J. DEM., Oct. 1993, at 18,29 ("In ethni-
cally divided societies, majority rule is not a solution, it is a problem, because it permits domination
apparently in perpetuity .... If Britain were an ethnically divided society ... and the Conserva-
tives, Labourites, and Liberal Democrats each represented a single ethnic group, the claim of per-
manent tyranny of a minority would be extremely plausible."). Writing about the recent violent
turmoil in Kenya that followed the highly disputed election result, Gettleman observed: "The roots
of the problem go deeper than the disputed election, in which the incumbent president, Mwai
Kibaki, was declared the winner over the top opposition leader, Raila Odinga, despite widespread
evidence of vote rigging.... Part of the trouble is the winner-take-all system in Kenya, which hap-
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bility is also a function of both how inclusive the institutions are and whether
those institutions provide the condition for sustained interethnic interaction that
might lead to some level of interethnic cohesion or perhaps even solidarity, 6 how-
ever thin it may be. In this article, I will outline and defend a version of delibera-
tive democracy, which I argue best responds to the needs of both inclusion and
cohesion that are essential for dealing with the problems afflicting these societies.
I shall also briefly contrast this approach with two well-known approaches that
have dominated studies of, and prescriptions for, severely fractured societies.7
I. THE ISSUE
A few years ago, a leading scholar of ethnic conflict made the following ob-
servation: "If the nineteenth was the century of Christian missionaries, the
twenty-first may become the century of constitutional missionaries.", This obser-
vation was made in 2000 following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its client
regimes in Eastern Europe. Many American and West European constitutional
scholars and policymakers traveled to these newly independent countries to offer
advice on how best to structure their basic laws (constitutions). That period is well
behind us, but the work of constitutional missionaries continues. There are many
countries in the developing world struggling to design constitutions, and these
scholars and policy makers continue to act formally as advisers and informally as
something more. Most of these countries can be described as severely fractured
societies where ethnicity has become a political cleavage such that political parties
and interests are defined by and organized around it. Therefore, the task, whether
it is for the missionaries or the natives, is how to devise accommodating institu-
tions in a world of (severely) divided loyalties.
pens in much of Africa, where leaders often favor members of their own ethnic group and in the
process alienate large swaths of the population." Jeffery Gettleman,Signsin Kenya ofa Land Redrawn
by Ethnicity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at Al; see also Kamuli Kasara, Tax Me if You Can: Ethnic
Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation ofAgriculture in Africa, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 159, 159 (2007)
("Case studies from a number of countries highlight instances in which African leaders have distrib-
uted goods to members of their own ethnic group or to their home area.").
6. By "solidarity," I mean to refer to a condition that Richard Rorty described as a feeling of
sympathy that is cultivated and enriched in a community of communication. RICHARD RORTY, CON-
TINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 189-98 (1989).
7. See discussion infra Part III.C.l-2.
8. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design and the Problem of Adoption: Proposals Versus Pro-
cesses, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT,
AND DEMOCRACY 15, 16 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:1
The central issue of institutional design in severely fractured societies is how
to devise structures and processes that can simultaneously capture the biography
of the entire people in its complexities and provide conditions for the reconstitut-
ing and retelling of that biography. Seeing the issue this way emphasizes both the
social fact of divided loyalties as well as their susceptibility to rearrangement and
transformation through sustained institutional engagement among the various
groups. The social fact of divided loyalties and competing identities suggests that
the legitimacy of those institutions positively correlates with their degree of inclu-
siveness. This is what might be referred to as sociological legitimacy. Moreover,
those institutions and processes must be normatively legitimate as well. They will
be legitimate in the normative sense to the extent that they provide the conditions
for the various groups to pursue fair terms of cooperation among themselves and,
indeed, fair terms of imagining the state itself, both in historical and current
terms.9 One critical task for ensuring normative legitimacy is to craft basic institu-
tions in severely fractured societies that capture the reality of fracture in the con-
text of promoting a democratic culture.'l
A major task for political and legal theorists in the twenty-first century will
be devising accommodating institutions in a world of divided loyalties. There are
three major reasons for thinking thus. First, there are many severely fractured
societies, especially in Africa and some parts of Asia, that need to develop such
9. This is similar to what Sujit Choudhry referred to as "constitutive constitutional politics" in
Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building: Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multina-
tional Polities, 37 CONN. L. REV. 933, 938 (2005).
10. 1 am aware that the notion of democracy is one of those "essentially contested concepts." For a
description of the notion of "essentially contested," see W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in
THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 121, 123 (Max Black ed., 1962) (The phrase "essentially contested
concepts" is used to refer to concepts whose very nature is a source of disagreement.) and WILLIAM E.
CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10 (2d ed. 1983) (following Gallie's understanding of
"essentially contested concepts"). For the proposition that "democracy" is one of those contested con-
cepts, see generally AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFOR-
MANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES (1999) (arguing that vast international disagreement over democracy
fits within the Galliean notion of an "essentially contested concept"). But the fact is that while the no-
tion of democracy is understood in different ways among different societies and even among people
within a particular society, most societies, including severely fractured societies, embrace some version
of democracy, a central purpose of which is to provide the condition for equal participation of mem-
bers of the relevant community. Now, not only is the concept of democracy contested, but there are
times when missionaries of democracy use it as a subterfuge to achieve other, less principled goals in
the same way that Christian missionaries in earlier times used the spread of the gospel as a subterfuge
to promote other, more worldly goals. A bumper sticker on a car seen in western Sweden expressed
this perfectly: "Be nice to America ... or we will bring democracy to your country."
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institutions if they are to survive as nation-states." Second, globalization and the
large movement of people across national boundaries are making an increasing
number of countries more diverse and thus creating competing loyalties and iden-
tities. One effect of globalization has been to heighten the tension between cosmo-
politanism and localism, evident in the paradoxical way in which power and
allegiances seem to be migrating from the nation-state. This migration is occur-
ring in both upward and downward directions to super-national and sub-national
institutions. Third, to the extent that devising international institutions is about
accommodating peoples of differing and often competing identities, we may learn
a great deal from attempts to devise accommodating institutions for severely frac-
tured societies. Thus, the task of devising institutions that can accommodate di-
versity is not only the concern of deeply fractured nation-states but also of
international and super-national organizations as well.
II. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO SEVERELY
FRACTURED SOCIETIES: TYPES OF SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION
By invoking the term "severely fractured societies," I mean to refer to societies
that are both "ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleav-
age around which interests are organized for political purposes such as elections."'2
11. Pierre Trudeau, the former prime minister of Canada, in the course of defending Canadian
federalism in the face of attacks from supporters of Quebec independence, argued that much of the
world looks like Canada (ethnically fractured) and that it perhaps will be increasingly fractured
and that the survival and flourishing of the Canadian experiment could serve as a guide for deal-
ing with the "world-wide problems of ethnic pluralism." PIERRE E. TRUDEAU, FEDERALISM AND
THE FRENCH CANADIANS 154, 178 (1968). Charles Taylor, the distinguished Canadian political
theorist, made this same point decades later. The deep division in Canada, Taylor observes, is
found "in many parts of the world today" and Canada "would do our own and some other peoples
a favour by exploring the space of deep diversity." Charles Taylor, Shared and Divergent Values, in
RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES 155, 183 (Guy Laforest ed., 1993).
12. BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR CON-
FLICT MANAGEMENT 4 (2001) (emphases omitted). The question of why voting patterns become eth-
nicized has elicited various answers. Some people, such as Samuel Huntington, view it as instinctual
and inevitable. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE
WORLD ORDER (1996). Others attribute it to changes in the political environment (such as changes in
jurisdictional or national boundaries). See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 3. Still others emphasize func-
tional reasons. Thus, for example, Fearon and Laitin suggest that shared language and shared social
networks make political action easier to organize along ethnic lines. James D. Fearon & David D.
Laitin, Explaining Inter-Ethnic Cooperation, 4 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 715 (1996). Others have suggested
that it is easy to provide patronage along ethnic lines. KANCHAN CHANDRA, WHY ETHNIC PARTIES
SUCCEED: PATRONAGE AND ETHNIC HEADCOUNTS IN INDIA 47 (2004). 1 shall not join the debate as to
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There are four factors that define severely fractured societies. First, they are frag-
mented along ethnic lines. Second, these divisions inform competing visions of
the state as a whole and thus competing visions of national identity.3 The "sever-
ity" to which I refer here is therefore not just about the intensity of the conflict but
also about the fundamental nature of the conflict, although it is often the case that
the two are closely connected. Third, as a result of these deep and thick identities
competing to define the nature of the state itself, majoritarian or aggregative de-
mocracy is often a problem rather than a solution. As Horowitz notes, "[i]n ethni-
cally divided societies, majority rule is not a solution; it is a problem, because it
permits domination, apparently in perpetuity."'4 Additionally, as Adam Przewor-
ski has noted, the stability of electoral democracy rests on the losers accepting de-
feat in the expectation that they might be able to win in subsequent elections; this
is not a realistic expectation when majoritarian democracy is utilized in severely
fractured societies. 5 Fourth, though fair distribution of resources might certainly
ease the fractures in these deeply divided societies, it will not be the entire answer,
for the issues at stake here are not merely, or even primarily, issues of distribution
of resources, but rather issues of identity. Here is where many political theorists,
why ethnicity becomes salient in severely fractured societies. For my purpose here, I shall assume
that there is some truth to both the functionalist and non-functionalist arguments.
13. See JOHN DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE GLOBAL POLITICS: DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY IN A DIVIDED
WORLD 46 (2006) ("A divided society is defined by mutually contradictory assertions of identity.");
Lahra Smith, Voting for an Ethnic Identity: Procedural and Institutional Responses to Ethnic Conflict in
Ethiopia, 45 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 565,567 (2007) ("Conflicts over the most appropriate political institu-
tions in multiethnic states frequently indicate competing visions of citizenship, not just competing
political interests."). See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED (1995); JACK L. SNY-
DER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONAL CONFLICT (2000).
14. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 29; see also AREND LIJPHART, POWER-SHARING IN SOUTH AFRICA 19
(1985) ("[Mlajority rule in plural societies spells majority dictatorship and civil strife."). John Dewey's
observation about majority rule is worth noting here. Dewey observed: "Majority rule, just as major-
ity rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it never is merely majority rule .... 'The
means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the more important thing': antecedent debates,
modification of views to meet the opinions of minorities.... The essential need, in other words, is the
improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion." JOHN DEWEY,
THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207-08 (Swallow Press 1991) (1927) (quoting Samuel J. Tilden).
15. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 23-24 (1991). Of course, losers could also accept the result if
they fear the consequence of the breakdown of order more than they hate perpetual losing. But the
fear of disorder will not serve as a disincentive for long if that order is purchased at the high price of
perpetual subordination.
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even distinguished ones, err. They assume that a just distribution of resources will
fully respond to the problems afflicting severely fractured societies. 6
What are the available responses to the challenges of ethnic divisions and
conflicts? 7 Of course, separation (secession, as it is formally known) is an option,
but in most cases such separation is neither feasible nor an adequate solution to the
problem. It is not feasible because there are so many severely fractured societies that
any attempt to solve the problem of deep division by providing for the process of
political divorce is likely to lead to chaos, especially in Africa and perhaps parts of
Asia and the Middle East. In any case, in many circumstances the various ethnic
groups do not occupy clearly defined geographic areas, which make it impossible for
any sensible process of separation to occur. It is also the case that in a large number
of circumstances, separation is not the desire of the groups, although each may wish
to define the state in its own ethnic image. Even if separation were feasible, it would
be unlikely to provide a long-term solution. There are two reasons for this. First, a
16. For an example of such a view, see generally BRIAN M. BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY: AN
EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001).
17. Of course, one could employ what I have elsewhere in another context called the Ostrich ap-
proach, which would deny the existence of ethnic division in the country until it explodes. Adeno
Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 719, 730-33 (2001). But that is not much of a response.
18. As Thomas Chapman and Philip Roeder note: "In the midst of civil wars in such diverse
countries as Serbia, Somalia, Iraq and Indonesia analysts have asked whether peace would be more
secure and democracy would be more likely to flourish if we portioned those countries rather than
attempted to keep them whole." Thomas Chapman & Philip G. Roeder, Partition asa Solution to Wars
of Nationalism: The Importance ofInstitutions, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 677,677 (2007). Indeed, no lesser
authority than John Stuart Mill thought that "[firee institutions are next to impossible in a country
made up of different nationalities." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REP-
RESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 292 (R.B. McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1859). For Mill, the con-
dition for living together is a sense of "fellow-feeling" which for him will not be there among people
speaking different languages. Id. The logical terminus of this observation is that under those circum-
stances political divorce is the only option. Eritrea separated from Ethiopia; and Slovakia and the
Czech Republic went their separate ways at the end of the collapse of communism in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Recently, we saw Kosovo take that route, separating from Serbia, al-
though that situation seems to remain highly disputed and volatile.
19. See JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 8 (1995)
("As writers as different as Ernest Gellner and David Maybury-Lewis have argued, the consequence
[of recognizing every "nation" as a country] is impractical."). Eighty percent of African borders run
along latitudinal and longitudinal lines, and the borders drawn by colonial powers do not coincide
with cohesive ethnic or national groups. In other words, colonizers created fragmented societies by
drawing artificial boundaries. Pierre Englebert et al., Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution
to the Debate on African Boundaries, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 1093, 1094-95 (2002); see also William East-
erly & Ross Levine, Africa's Growth Tragedy: Political and Ethnic Divisions, 112 Q.J. OF ECON. 1203,
1205-06 (1997) (arguing that ethnic fragmentation reduces consensus for public goods).
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new unit is likely to have some ethnic minorities within itself, and those minorities
may have the same sort of concerns that the majority in the new unit had when it
was (a minority) part of another country. 0 If this were the case, it would again raise
the question of how different groups with sharp and contrasting identities can live
together.2' Second, and even more worrying, the new unit may engage in some sort
of ethnic cleansing to purge itself of future ethnic problems, especially if a minority
ethnic group borders a state run by co-ethnics.22
Consociation has been championed as perhaps the best way to manage ethnic
cleavages in severely fractured societies.23 Consociational democracy advocates for
mechanisms that would allow political elites within the various ethnic groups to
20. For example, in Ethiopia "[n]one of nine regional states is mono-ethnic." Jon Abbink, Ethnic-
ity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia, 41 J. AFR. L. 159, 163 (1997) (citing census re-
ports on the various regional states). This is especially the case in two of'the states where there are
active secessionist groups (the Oromia and Somali states).
21. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia over the vehement opposition of both the Ser-
bian state and Serb minorities in Kosovo itself. Kosovo's Serb population "greeted the secession as
though it were amputation. Many vowed not to accept the loss of a region they consider the heart of
their homeland." William J. Kole, In Kosovo It's 'Independence Eve', ABC NEWS, Feb. 17, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/printid= 4301312. It is not just the fact that secession might paradoxically
reproduce the problem that led to the claim of secession, but that it also raises the issue of injustice.
See, e.g., Chaim Gans, National Self-Determination: A Sub - and Inter-Statist Conception, 13 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 185 (2000) (viewing self-determination in terms of secession hides the fact that
often it is a majority that decides to have its own state and a minority that wishes not to secede (even
if it participates in the voting) will have been treated unjustly). But, of course, the injustice could be
avoided if self-determination is viewed as establishing a state consisting of one nation and one nation
alone. One author viewed this as the ideal condition. See Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Deter-
mination, 105 ETHICS 352, 359 (1995) ("The ideal group's ideal borders encompass all those who
share its identity, and only those who share its identity."). But unless one engages in ethnic cleans-
ing, no such ideal condition exists.
22. The removal of ethnic groups from one state to another could come about in three ways. One
state could make the life of an ethnic minority so intolerable that members of that minority flee to
the land of their co-ethnics. This, for example, could happen in Kosovo. There could also be exten-
sive exchange of population between two neighboring states, which of course is a form of ethnic
cleansing, dislocating people from their homes and transferring them to another country. This is
exactly what happened between India and Pakistan at the time of the partition and between Greece
and Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne. "More than a million Greeks were sent from Turkey to
Greece, and a smaller number of Turks from Greece to Turkey, thereby drastically reducing
diasporic presence on both sides of the border." YossI SHAIN, KINSHIP AND DIASPORAS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS 14 (2007). There could also be an exchange of territories that are inhabited by co-
ethnics. This last option is in my view the least offensive.
23. See Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 1. DEM., Apr. 2004, at 96, 99
(Consociation "offers the best fit for most divided societies regardless of their individual circum-
stances and characteristics.").
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share power (a system referred to as a grand coalition).2 Power sharing could take
various forms, but an important ingredient is proportional representation of all sig-
nificant groups in the machineries of government, such as legislative bodies, the ex-
ecutive department, and civil service jobs. Another feature of consociation is the
power of minorities to veto major decisions, which means that key decisions would
need a high degree of consensus if they were to be adopted.25 Consociational democ-
racy is clearly an alternative to majoritarian or aggregative democracy because it
prevents perpetual domination of ethnic minorities by ethnic majorities. Consocia-
tionalism is premised on the notion that ethnic groups are likely to organize along
ethnic lines, and thus aggregative majoritarianism will be a mechanism of exclusion
rather than inclusion. Consociational democracy has been criticized as encouraging
rather than discouraging strident ethnic politics to the extent that it endorses and
reinforces the combination of ethnic-based parties and proportional representa-
tion.26 The argument here is that consociationalism does not provide incentives for
ethnic parties to make appeals across ethnic lines; therefore, politics would continue
to be seen as a zero-sum game for each ethnic party. Critics contend that this will
not only distort political outcomes but also that it does not encourage long-term
stability. I generally agree with these sentiments.
In contrast to a consociational democracy, an incentive-based or integrationist
democracy, often associated with the work of Donald Horowitz, recommends
designing institutions that will provide "political incentives to encourage intereth-
nic moderation."27 The task here is to induce moderate behavior on the side of
elected officials by requiring them to depend on the votes of groups other than
their own in order to be elected to office. As Horowitz put it, the integrationist
model does not seek to reverse majoritarian practices but rather "aims at majori-
24. As the most prominent advocate of consociationalism, Arend Lijphart said: "The primary
characteristic of the consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments
of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country." AREND LIJPHART, DE-
MOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 25 (1977).
25. See Arend Lijphart, Varieties of Nonmajoritarian Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS:
THE LIFE WORK OF AREND LIjPHART 225, 228 (Markus M. L. Crepaz et al. eds., 2000) (The consocia-
tional model involves "grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto.").
26. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTI-
TUTIONS 253, 258-59 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). One of the early and trenchant
critiques of consociational democracy is in Brian Barry, Political Accommodation and Consociational
Democracy, 5 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 477, 477-505 (1975) (reviewing AREND LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF
ACCOMMODATION (1975)).
27. Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, J. DEM., Apr. 2003, at 5,
15;see also Horowitz, supra note 26, at 262.
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tarian decisions by moderate, interethnic center."2 The integrationist approach's
emphasis on incentives for moderation attempts to deal with an aspect of the
problem that consociation fails to address: the prospect of permanent warring
factions.29 As I shall argue in the next section, while consociation emphasizes in-
clusion at the expense of the cultivation of a national community, identity, or com-
mon political purpose, the integrationist approach pursues moderation-a
common political purpose, perhaps at the expense of full inclusion. 0 Indeed, the
whole purpose of electoral engineering, as far as the integrationists are concerned,
is to marginalize those considered extremists and to elect only those who will oc-
cupy the imperial center (the moderates). As I shall argue later, this approach is
likely to lead to a truncated deliberative process after the election to the extent that
the substance of deliberation has been electorally narrowed."
Another approach to the problem is a version of deliberative democracy I
shall outline and defend in the next section. This version is sensitive to both inclu-
28. Horowitz, supra note 26, at 259; see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH
AFRICA? 165 (1991).
29. The agonists will of course think that this is perfectly acceptable to the extent that enemies
are transformed into adversaries. Agonists argue that the main task of democracy is to convert an-
tagonism into agonism and enemies into adversaries, for they believe that deliberation is incapable
of processing deep differences. See generally WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMO-
CRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 4 (1991); BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE
DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS (1993); CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000); Chantal
Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 Soc. RES. 745 (1999).
30. For example, a party that advocates secession may find it difficult to win under the integration-
ist model. Perhaps the process is meant to exclude such groups from the conversation. Many fractured
societies continue to suffer instability and even destructive conflicts as a result of defining those who
are not yet convinced of the value of continuing the marriage as outside the circle of acceptable dia-
logue partners. Turkey provides the clearest example. The Turkish Constitution requires the Consti-
tutional Court to dissolve permanently any political party whose "statutes and programmes, as well as
[its] activities [are] in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its terri-
tory and nation." Constitution of the Republic of Turkey arts. 68, 128. This constitutional provision
and laws passed pursuant to it have been used to exclude Kurdish nationalists from the national con-
versation. In the same way that states used to exclude anti-democratic groups from the electoral pro-
cess on the principle of "the right to democratic self-defense," many fractured societies have made it
difficult for secessionist parties to take part in the political process on the ground of "nationalist self-
defense." But of course the issue in most of these societies is precisely what the nations should look
like. For the notion that democracies have the right to defend the democratic process and the in-
tegrity of the territorial state, see discussion in Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1405, 1421-51 (2007).
31. In the Horowitzian approach there is the possibility of robust deliberation, but it takes place
at the time of the campaign rather than after it. MICHAEL RABINDER JAMES, DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY & THE PLURAL POLITY 190 (2004) ("Horowitz's approach, on the other hand, locates plural
deliberation at the campaign level.").
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Sion (pluralism) and the cultivation of interethnic dialogue, which has the pros-
pect of transforming the hard parameter of ethnic identity into a soft parameter
of diversity in the context of an equally soft but sustainable cohesion. 2 I shall refer
to that version of deliberative democracy as pluralistic solidarity to indicate that
the approach will simultaneously affirm and accommodate multiple identities in
a particular territorial community while at the same time cultivating a notion of
"we the people" at the national level.
The notion that deliberation or discourse is essential for transforming hard
parameters into soft ones is premised on the proposition that identities are partly
bound up with discourse, and what has been imagined through stories and dis-
courses can partly be reimagined through discourse as well. In this sense, Bene-
dict Anderson's observation about nations-that they are partly imagined-could
easily apply to ethnic groups.33 But to say that ethnic groups are imagined is not to
say that they are therefore unreal or false.
34
32. For the distinction between soft and hard parameters, see Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of
Liberal Equality, in 11 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1, 70 (Grethe B. Peterson ed.,
1990).
We must distinguish between what I shall call hard and soft parameters. Parame-
ters, as I said, enter into the description of any challenge or assignment: they de-
scribe the conditions of successful performance. Hard parameters state essential
conditions: if they are violated the performance is a total failure, no matter how
successful in other respects.... Soft parameters are those aspects of assignment
that, when violated, reduce the value of the performance but do not annihilate it:
they act as standards of good performance that permit defects to be compensated
by high success against other standards.
Id.
33. BENEDICT R. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM 6 (rev. ed. 1991) (The nation "is an imagined political community-and imagined
as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion.").
34. Id. ("In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and per-
haps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuine-
ness, but by the style in which they are imagined.").
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III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN SEVERELY FRACTURED SOCIETIES:
THE CASE FOR PLURALISTIC SOLIDARITY
A. The Nature of Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy emerged as an alternative to aggregative majoritarian-
ism. Although context is important in the development and elaboration of delibera-
tive democracy, the central principles ofdeliberative democracy could be summarized
as follows: at the heart of a genuine process of deliberation is the idea that collective
decision making is to proceed in a manner in which participants advance proposals
and propositions. Participants must then defend those proposals with reasons that
are accessible to and acknowledged as reasons by fellow participants whose only
motivation is the cooperative search for the truth or the most defensible result or ar-
rangement.3" An implicit requirement of a genuine deliberative process is that all
participants are treated as free and equal with reasonable commitments of their
own. The reason-giving requirement of dialogue, or discourse, as Jilrgen Habermas
refers to it,3 6 is a central requirement of deliberation.3 7 For a deliberative process to
treat participants as free and equal, it must provide them with roughly equal insti-
tutional and material resources to engage in the dialogue. Such provisions would
also likely enhance the pool of reasoned arguments. Furthermore, the very nature
of the deliberative process of justification assumes that participants in collective de-
35. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 7 (2004) (defining
deliberative democracy as "a form ofgovernment in which free and equal citizens (and their represen-
tatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually accept-
able and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on
all citizens but open to challenge in the future."). Gutmann and Thompson observe that deliberation's
"first and most important characteristic, then, is its reason-giving requirement.... [These] are reasons
that should be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation." Id. at 3.
36. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THE-
ORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 278-79 (William Rehg trans., Suhrkamp Verlag 1996) (1992) ("[Dis-
course theory] insists on the fact that democratic will-formation does not draw its legitimating
force from the prior convergence of settled ethical convictions. Rather, the source of legitimacy
includes, on the one hand, the communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to
come into play in various forms of deliberation and, on the other, procedures that secure fair bar-
gaining conditions."); see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 3.
37. See Joshua Cohen, Procedural and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95,99 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) ("A
deliberative conception [of democracy] puts public reasoning at the center of political justification.").
Joseph M. Bessette calls deliberation the "mild voice of reason." JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD
VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994).
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN SEVERELY FRACTURED SOCIETIES 71
cision making enter the dialogue with the view that "the reasons given, and the
reasons responded to, have the capacity to change minds."3
Put simply, there are three conditions to a well-functioning deliberative system.
First, all those who are expected to submit to laws and institutions of a polity have the
right to participate fully and equally in the development of those institutions and
laws. This can be referred to as the principle of deliberative equality. Second, these
equal participants are to engage in a dialogue, advancing and defending proposals
and propositions with reasons that are acknowledged as such by and accessible to oth-
ers who are themselves free and equal participants. "[D]ecisions are not simply based
on the counting of votes but also on the sharing of reasons."39 This reason-giving
condition can be called the common pool of reason. Third, deliberative democracy
assumes that each party comes to the dialogue with the motivation of reaching con-
sensus or fair terms of cooperation. This can be referred to as the principle of reci-
procity. Of course, it is in the nature of the deliberative process that decisions will lead
to further dialogue and revision, as participants take into account the preferences and
views of others, and in the process transform their own views and preferences. Con-
ceived this way, deliberative democracy provides a better way of achieving long-term
stability in severely fractured societies, for it ensures, or at a minimum has the poten-
tial for, both inclusion and connection. In this respect, deliberative democracy is more
promising than consociation which cultivates inclusion, but often without providing
the institutional means for connection. It is also more promising then integration,
which highlights the need for connection by emphasizing moderation at the electoral
level, often without paying due attention to the exclusionary aspect of that strategy.
B. Deliberative Democracy in Severely Fractured Societies
In severely fractured societies, the principle of deliberative equality counsels
that no group with a sizable constituency should be excluded from the process of
institutional dialogue on account of that group being militant-beyond the ac-
ceptable moderate spectrum-and hence a threat to the stability of the fractured
polity. This is so for three reasons. First, excluding groups from the dialogic pro-
cess is a violation of the principle of deliberative equality to the extent that a seg-
38. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 20;see also DRYZEK, supra note 13, at 27 ("For delib-
eration occurs whenever participants are amenable to changing their minds as a result of reflection
induced by non-coercive communication."). Kwame Anthony Appiah captures the fact that dis-
agreement presupposes the possibility of agreement when he notes: "Disagreement presupposes the
cognitive option of agreement." KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 255 (2005).
39. Steven Wheatley, Deliberative Democracy and Minorities, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 507, 509-10 (2003).
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ment of the population for whom that group speaks is left unrepresented.40
Second, the exclusion diminishes the aggregate pool of reason for the deliberative
process and may consequently undermine the capacity of the deliberative process
to lead to fair terms of cooperation. Third, as an empirical matter, it is likely that
an excluded group will, along with its supporters, believe that it has been shut out
from playing any role in creating the identity of "we the people" and thus will be
more of a threat from the outside than it would be from within. The incentive-
based (or integrationist) approach that attempts to ensure stability by electorally
engineering an imperial middle will be unlikely to ensure stability and cohesion.
A lasting stability will come about only as a result of a moderation that is born of
dialogue rather than one that is electorally engineered. What is needed is not an
ex ante preclusion of a group or a group's interest but a deliberative process that
will induce reflection among groups on those interests.
As I noted earlier, consociation clearly satisfies the principle of deliberative equal-
ity to the extent that its goal is the inclusion of all groups with a sizable constituency
in a national grand coalition. But it is also reasonable to assume that elite-dominated
grand coalitions, where each group's (at least each extremist group's) long-term pros-
pect as part of the coalition is dependent on the continuation of sharp differences
among the various groups, may not provide the condition for interethnic, reasoned
dialogue with fair terms of cooperation as the goal. This becomes even more evident
when one realizes that proportional representation is accompanied by minority veto
powers. If groups view their continued existence as depending on practicing strident
ethnic politics and if minority veto power is exercised to protect the ethnic status quo,
then genuine deliberation with fair terms of cooperation as its goal would not be pos-
sible.41 In the next section, I will explore institutional structures that would minimize
such tendencies and maximize the chances of interethnic dialogue.
40. A 1995 resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (recently renamed the
United Nations Human Rights Council) makes the point. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1995/60,
11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1995/60 (Mar. 7, 1995). Deliberation requires that "all tendencies, in-
terests and feelings" obtain representation within government. Id.
41. This is the point Brian Barry made with considerable force over three decades ago. Seegener-
ally Barry,supra note 26.
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C. Institutionalizing Deliberative Democracy in Severely Fractured Societies
If deliberative democracy is to be of any use to severely fractured societies, it
needs to take institutional designs seriously,42 however difficult that may be. What
types of institutional structures would be conducive to a deliberative form of de-
mocracy that will ensure long-term stability and perhaps even solidarity? Each
fractured society has its own specific history and specific points of fracture, and
institutions will have to respond to those needs and histories. But there are a few
general principles that, though not exhaustive, might be suggested as conducive to
deliberative democracy. The general principles come in the form of "do's" and
"don'ts." That is, there are certain matters that need to be institutionalized and
others that ought not be part of the formal institutional processes if genuine delib-
erative democracy is to be fostered.
1. The Vice of Constitutionalizing the Right to Secede
Some ethnically divided societies, such as Ethiopia, provide for the right to se-
cede in their constitutions.43 The constitutionalization of such a right can be de-
fended on two grounds. First, it may be said to send an important signal to the
various ethnic groups or nations, as they are called in some countries, that this is a
voluntary union and divorce is available if it appears that the marriage is not work-
ing (or not working well) for any of the parties. Second, the availability of secession
as a constitutional right may lead the various ethnic groups to attempt the union,
which they might not have done were that right not available. Neither ground seems
persuasive. One does not need to insert a right to secession in the constitution to re-
alize that any continued union in fractured societies will be possible only to the ex-
tent that it is a voluntary association. No one can keep a group as part of the union
by force for any significant length of time; conversely, no group that is determined to
keep a country united will shy away from using force to achieve that objective, even
if there is a right to secede in the constitution, as was the case with the former Soviet
42. See Peter McLaverty & Darren Halpin, Deliberative Drift: The Emergence of Deliberation in
the Policy Process, 29 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 197, 198 (2008) ("[Flor scholars interested in political de-
liberation, the focus of attention should be on the design of institutions which are likely to promote
deliberation between participants.").
43. See Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia art. 39(l)(a). "Every Nation,
Nationality or People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the
right to secession." Id. This right is thought to belong to a group of fundamental rights that cannot
be suspended even under emergencies threatening the life of the nation. See id. art. 93(1)(a).
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Union44 and the current regime in Ethiopia.45 As for the notion that such a right will
incline groups to try out the marriage, it is not entirely clear why that would be so
and what the value of a trial is if the very reason that led them to try it ends up un-
dermining the long-term stability of the marriage.
Even if one were to agree that there is some merit to the arguments in support
of constitutionalizing the right to secession, the existence of such a right will have
a significant negative impact on the deliberative process and on the long-term vi-
ability of the union. This is so for a number of reasons. First, to provide for a right
of secession at that initial moment, when passion, and perhaps the desire to exit, is
still high, is to seriously undercut even the possibility of a good beginning of a
genuine, cooperative endeavor with fair terms of cooperation as its goal. Second,
even in the long term, such a right is likely to be used strategically, especially by
those in resource-rich areas, to extract more than their fair share both in terms of
resource allocations and power sharing.46 That will clearly be inconsistent with a
genuine deliberative process and will not ensure long-term stability.47 Genuine
deliberation assumes not just equality of participants but also the principle of rec-
iprocity-that parties are engaged in a common political enterprise and that they
owe each other "justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies
they collectively enact."'48 Strategic behavior is not conducive to that.49
Third, the right to secession is likely to divert the process of deliberation from
44. "Article 17 of Stalin's 1936 constitution and Article 72 of the constitution that replaced that one
in 1977, both proclaim that 'Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the
USSR.' Of course ... it is presumed that the Kremlin leaders did not seriously entertain the possibil-
ity of this right actually being exercised." WAYNE NORMAN, NEGOTIATING NATIONALISM: NATION-
BUILDING, FEDERALISM, AND SECESSION IN THE MULTINATIONAL STATE 176 (2006).
45. The rather brutal way that the government has dealt with the secessionist movement of the
Oromia and Somalia states over the years is an indication that the government does not have any
intention of allowing discussion about secession.
46. It is true that anything could be used for strategic purposes, such as natural resources, even
when there is no right to secede, but it seems to me that the availability of secession will increase
strategic behavior significantly.
47. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 102 (2001).
48. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 98.
49. To understand the difference between strategic and deliberative politics, it might be useful to
turn to Jfirgen Habermas's distinction between instrumental or strategic rationality on the one hand
and communicative rationality on the other hand. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMU-
NICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 82-101,256-88 (Thomas McCa-
rthy trans., 1984). According to Habermas, instrumental or strategic rationality occurs when parties
approach communication or interaction with the aim of defeating all opposing views and are unwill-
ing to listen to and reflect on the views of others. See id. On the other hand, communicative rational-
ity-the equivalent of deliberative politics-is a process of entering into communication with an
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one involving a particular subunit and other subunits within the relevant nation-
state to one involving that subunit and a neighboring country, if that country is run
by co-ethnics. Put simply, the right will encourage irredentism50 more than it would
deliberation with fair terms of cooperation as its goal. Many severely divided societ-
ies, including Ethiopia, have irredentist groups, and constitutionalizing the right to
secession will discourage rather than encourage a genuine deliberative process
within the societies themselves." To sum up, the constitutionalization of the right to
secession is more likely than not to lead to a "seemingly never-ending, secessionist
politics [that] can be as unfortunate for the larger state as secession itself'5 2
To argue that a right to secession will have a negative impact on the delibera-
tive process is not to deny that secession may in fact be the only option under cer-
tain circumstances, where the marriage is simply unworkable and a particular
group continues to be dominated in a morally arbitrary way. 3 Rather, it is to ob-
serve that the explicit provision of a right to secession in a constitution would un-
dermine the process of open and sincere deliberation about fair terms of
cooperation, and that if the marriage has failed miserably, the lack of a right to
open mind and a willingness to listen to the argument of others and be swayed by the force of the
argument. See id.
50. "Irredentism" is defined as a process "when one ethnic group attempts to secede to join co-eth-
nic communities in other states." James Habyarimana et al., Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?: Parting Ways
Over Nationalism and Separatism, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2008, at 138, 139. Horowitz defines it with
the emphasis not on the separatists but on the potential incorporators, as "the attempt to detach land
and people from one state in order to incorporate them in another ... [or] the attempt to detach land
and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state...."
Donald L. Horowitz, Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections, in IRRE-
DENTISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 9, 10 (Naomi Chazan ed., 1991). An example of the first kind
of irredentism is the Somalis in Ethiopia who are often desire to join Somalia, a goal encouraged by
successive Somali governments. See id. An example of the second type is the aspiration of the Kurds in
Turkey, Syria, Iran and perhaps even Iraq to constitute themselves as a country called Kurdistan. See
id. See generally HOROWITZ,supra note 3, at 281-88; Horowitz, supra note 27, at 5, 10-14.
51. In the case of Ethiopia, federal units are drawn generally along ethnic lines. One of the units
(the Ogaden) is in fact named the Somali State. Somalia borders this Somali State and successive
governments have laid claims to the area. To insert a right to secession and to name the unit with
exactly the same name as the neighboring state is to go a long way to undercut the possibility of
genuine deliberation within the country.
52. NORMAN, supra note 44, at 197. 1 must note here that Norman makes the point to support
(rather than to oppose, as I do here) the constitutionalization of the right to secede.
53. See generally Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theory of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322 (1991), for a
thoughtful exposition of the conditions which might justify secession. Also, see generally SECESSION
AND SELF-DETERMINATION (Stephen Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 2003), especially the essays by
Allen Buchanan and Wayne Norman, and ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL LAw (2004).
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secede in the constitution is not going to make much difference in whether the
unit in fact manages to leave the union.
2. The Virtue of Incompletion
One serious shortcoming of many constitutions, including those of severely
fractured societies, is that those documents attempt to be comprehensive and
hence pursue a sense of completion. Completion is a virtue in many areas of life,
but not in constitutional design or the structuring of government. Indeed, with
respect to constitutional design, especially by severely fractured societies, incom-
pletion is a virtue. 4 By incompleteness or incompletion, I mean to suggest that
many controversial issues are left for the deliberative process itself. There are a
number of reasons why incompletion is a virtue in the designing of constitutional
structures and documents. First, many of the most divisive issues, including the
very meaning of difference or unity, become terrains of deliberative engagement.
Ambiguity on the many divisive issues, at least as an initial matter, is not a bad
idea at all. In the course of deliberation, a tradition, though not a text, may de-
velop that may become a focus of consensus. Second, a national constitution that
leaves many substantive issues unaddressed is one that leaves space for local orga-
nizations and associations, as well as non-governmental actors, to join in the con-
struction of traditions that may best deal with some of the divisive issues. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, a national constitution that does not attempt to be
comprehensive about finding the solutions to the many thorny substantive issues
that plague severely divided societies sends a signal to the various communities
that the identity of the state is not defined exclusively by the national government.
That signal will reduce the high-stakes competition among the various groups for
national power to make the state in their own image. Incompletion will incline
groups in severely fractured societies to constitute a more sustainable association
by providing an environment in which solutions to thorny identity issues are de-
veloped deliberatively and incrementally;55 where the deliberative arenas are
broadened to include local and non-state actors and fora; and where the intensity
of competition among groups to define a unitary, national identity is reduced.
John Dryzek is likely correct in his observation that the "very worst repression of
54. Speaking generally about institutional and conceptual designs, Michael Walzer once observed
that "[i]ncompleteness is a virtue ... for it leaves room for local self-determination and cultural diver-
sity." Michael Walzer, Review: The Virtue of Incompletion, 19 THEORY & Soc'Y 225, 225 (1990).
55. For a discussion of the danger of freezing specific arrangements, see John McGarry & Bren-
dan O'Leary, Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription, 5 INT'L J.
CON. L. 670, 691 (2007).
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competing identities has often come from actors struggling to secure their hold
over a state and the state's hold over a society."56
There is another aspect of incompletion worth noting. It is not only in relation
to substantive issues that we must refrain from completion but also in terms of lan-
guage that appears to foreclose the possibility of inclusive alternative patterns for the
state by closely associating the dominant group with the state itself. Thus, when the
Macedonian constitution makes Macedonia the "national state of the Macedonian
people,"57 thereby linguistically marginalizing the various ethnic minorities within
the state, such as the Serbs and Turks, the stage is set for intense conflict over the
symbolic capture of the state. This attempt at symbolic completion will distract from
the process of constructing national identity through the deliberative process. Dec-
laration of symbolic possession of the state is an impediment rather than a facilitator
of deliberation. The same could be said about the declaration of a state to opt for a
single official language without a procedure through which the linguistic interests
of the various groups have been given equal consideration and respect.5"
To the extent that a central purpose of deliberation is to shape preferences,
beliefs, and identities, and consequently to subject them to reasoned arguments
that may result in their transformation, a major goal of a constitutional scheme in
severely divided societies must be to protect the deliberative process. This can be
done both by leaving major substantive issues to the process and by broadening
the participants and fora of deliberation.
3. The Value of Multiple Spheres of Deliberation
One aspect of broadening the spheres of deliberation is cultivating delibera-
tive domains in the various constituents' units, where what Cass Sunstein calls
"enclave deliberation"5 9 could take place. In other words, this is where issues im-
portant for the specific ethnic groups are hammered out before they become is-
sues of deliberation on the national level. Such deliberative processes will perform
three important functions.
First, to the extent that the particular unit has adopted as its official language a
language that is different from the national language, and to the extent that some or
56. DRYZEK, supra note 13, at 55.
57. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia pmbl.
58. For a detailed exploration of whether and how commitments to deliberative democracy and to
linguistic multiplicity could be reconciled, see generally Adeno Addis, Constitutionalizing Deliberative
Democracy in Multilingual Societies, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 117 (2007). See also Addis,supra note 17.
59. SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 15 ("[Elnclave deliberation [is] ... deliberation within small
groups of like-minded people.").
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many in that unit speak only the vernacular, local deliberative processes would be
more effective in getting the locals engaged in the political life of the unit and the
nation. 6 Second, deliberative processes at the local level will allow ethnic groups to
debate and refine issues before those issues are presented as, or become, issues of
national concern. Third, as I have already noted, a genuine and autonomous delib-
erative process at the local level may reduce the intense competition among the vari-
ous ethnic groups to shape the identity of the nation in their own, often exclusivist,
images. The competition for national power in severely divided societies is often a
competition for the power to paint an exclusive national identity. It should be noted,
however, that experience shows that in some cases, national leaders of multinational
states use constituent ethnic units, federal or otherwise, not as entities of local self-
determination and autonomous deliberation, but rather as tools of decentralized
control 6' used to entrench "the hegemonic state.''62 This, of course, is inconsistent
with the notion of deliberation that I am advocating.
Another aspect of broadening the deliberative process is including diasporas in
the process of constitutional settlement (and hence in the deliberative process). It is
abundantly clear that diasporas, especially those from severely divided societies,
have played and will continue to play significant roles in the life of their homelands.
The diasporas' role in homeland conflicts is well documented. 6 Diasporas finance
60. See generally Addis,supra note 58 and Addis,supra note 17, for a fuller exploration of this point
in relation to deliberation in multilingual societies.
61. Ethiopia is a good example. The current government organized the country into an ethnic
federation, with each federal unit supposedly autonomous and with broad power, but as a recent New
York Times article notes, "Ethiopia is now more or less centrally controlled by members of a small
ethnic group." Gettleman, supra note 5; see also Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its
Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 44-45, 52
(1996) (discussing the problems of tribalism in Ethiopia). In this respect, Ethiopia is no different from
the Soviet Union, which also organized its fifteen constituent republics in ways that corresponded to
boundaries and names of dominant ethnic groups so that they could supposedly act autonomously. But
the truth was that those republics were controlled from the center and the governments and institu-
tions of those republics were simply local means of central control. The control even had a name,
"democratic centralism." FIVE CONSTITTrIONs 29 (S.E. Finer ed., 1979).
62. ILAN PELEG, DEMOCRATIZING THE HEGEMONIC STATE 3 (2007) ("1 call a state that energetically
promotes the interests of a single ethnopolitical group in a multinational setting a hegemonic state.").
63. See SHAIN, supra note 22, at 101-26. "The diaspora's role in homeland conflict perpetuation
and conflict resolution can be so powerful that homeland leaders ignore diaspora preferences at
their own peril." Id. at 101.
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rebellions" and co-ethnics fighting for independence65 or fairer terms of coopera-
tion.66 At times, they have even organized political parties outside the country or
run those which were established within the country from abroad. And yet, despite
the widespread recognition of the important role diasporas play in conflict perpetu-
ation as well as conflict resolution in their homelands, there have been no serious
attempts intellectually or institutionally to focus on how diasporas could be included
in the process of constitutional settlement. It is an essential part of the constitutional
settlement of severely fractured societies that there are institutional mechanisms of
including diasporas in the process. How they would be represented is a complicated
question, but overlooking their significance is not the answer. Diaspora representa-
tion in the institutional life of the homeland is not as strange as one may think. It
was only a few years ago that Mexico held elections among its expatriates north of
the border. The election was to assemble an advisory council of 115 persons within
the Institute for Mexicans Abroad that was meant to give advice to the Mexican
government on a range of issues.67
4. Electoral Systems and the Deliberative Process
The nature of the electoral system has a serious impact on the robustness and
inclusiveness of the deliberative process, but engineering the appropriate electoral
system for a severely divided society is a difficult, even impossible, task. However,
the following general outline seems consistent with the notion of deliberative de-
mocracy that I have recommended in this article. First, I agree with consociational-
ists that wide and inclusive representation of all significant groups is important,6 for
there cannot be full deliberation when some groups are excluded from the delibera-
64. A good example is the Haitian diaspora that financed and organized coups. See generally
Michel S. Laguerre, Homeland Political Crisis, the Virtual Diasporic Public Sphere, and Diasporic
Politics, 10 J. LATIN AM. ANTHRO. 206 (2005); Walt Bogdanich & Jenny Nordberg, Mixed U.S. Sig-
nals Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al.
65. The Tamil diaspora living in Canada and Europe provides substantial resources that sustain
the armed struggle for a separate Tamil state in the north and northeastern part of war-torn Sri
Lanka. See DANIEL BYMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT MOVEMENTS 50-53
(2001). For an extensive discussion of the role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or conflict resolu-
tion, see SHAIN, supra note 22, at 101-26.
66. The support of Irish Americans for the Catholics in the Northern Ireland dispute may be
viewed in this light.
67. See Oscar Avila, Cicero Lawmaker's Hat in Mexico Race, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2005, at Cl, cited
in Anupam Chander, Homeward Bound, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 71 (2006).
68. What constitutes "significance" is a hard question, but it is also clear that one cannot devise a
system of proportional representation that includes all ethnic groups regardless of how small the
number, for that would make governance rather difficult. But the threshold cannot be too high ei-
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tive process. Indeed, as I argued earlier, it is not only the principle of deliberative
equality and hence the principle of political equality that counsels for such inclusion
but also the fact that exclusion will reduce the aggregate pool of reason by depriving
the deliberative process of the views of certain groups. There cannot be a fair scheme
of cooperation when some voices are not heard. This may suggest the adoption of
some form of proportional representation for the legislative branch of government.
On the other hand, electoral systems, such as those advocated by Horowitz and oth-
ers who promote incentive-based approaches, are unlikely to be adopted as an initial
matter because the potential targets of exclusion and their supporters will not agree
to them, or, if they are adopted, will push excluded militants to adopt more radical
and perhaps violent ways of undermining the arrangement. That cannot lead to the
sort of stability that is the object of such approaches.
Second, although proportional representation might need to be part of the elec-
toral structure, there is no need, on account of either the requirements of the delibera-
tive process or the need for stability, to adopt proportional representation in all spheres
of government-legislative, executive, and the bureaucracy-as consociationalists
would urge.69 There is no virtue in such a uniform approach. Indeed, if deliberation
across ethnic groups is to be encouraged, such across-the-board proportional repre-
sentation may be undesirable. Thus, a severely fractured society that has adopted a
parliamentary system and has adopted proportional representation for the legislative
branch may, for example, opt to require that members of the government, specifically
members of the executive such as cabinet ministers, be chosen under a system that
would promote individuals who appeal to members of the other ethnic groups. An
example of such a system would be one that requires a cabinet minister to secure
weighted-majority support across the whole legislature." A full and unfiltered debate
in the legislative body (deliberative equality) may be supplemented and comple-
ther, otherwise the system will exclude all except the large ethnic groups. Alternatively, two or three
small ethnic groups may decide to pull together so as to meet the threshold for representation.
69. See AREND L[JPHARTsupra note 25, at 125.
70. Ian O'Flynn makes a similar point. One way to achieve a government that will cultivate mod-
eration is "to make government-formation depend on inter-ethnic agreement rather than on automatic
appointment, with government ministers having to secure weighted-majority support from across the
legislature as a whole (akin to Lebanese Council of Ministers)." Ian O'Flynn, Divided Societies and
Deliberative Democracy, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCL 731, 749 (2007). 1 must note here, however, that the recent
open conflict between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government has led to a new pact (brokered by
Arab mediators), which by all accounts gives an enhanced role to Hezbollah and its supporters. For
details of the agreement, see Robert F. Worth & Nada Bakri, Lebanon Agreement Shifts Power to Hez-
bollah, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 21, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/21/
africa/22lebanon.php ?page= 2.
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mented with a differently constituted executive branch. The inclusiveness of one
branch acts as a complement to the integrative inclination of another branch.
Third, one of the features of consociation is the idea of minority veto. Minor-
ity vetoes are assurances that important decisions affecting minorities would not
be decided without their consent. From the point of view of deliberative democ-
racy, minority vetoes may perform valuable functions by inclining ethnic groups
to develop and offer reasons for their commitments and positions that are accept-
able to other ethnic groups and that take their interests and concerns into account.
Put simply, minority vetoes may, as paradoxical as it may sound, encourage genu-
ine deliberation. But vetoes have potential drawbacks as well. Not only is there the
possibility of paralysis on many issues, but the presence of minority vetoes, just
like the constitutionalization of secession, may cause some groups not to take the
deliberative process seriously.
To lessen the potential of paralysis and to encourage a genuine deliberative pro-
cess, institutional protection of minorities may take various forms. For example, the
overall requirement of a vote in relation to key decisions such as the budget and the
election of speaker of the house may be by supermajority (perhaps 60 percent), with
a lower threshold requirement for each ethnic group (perhaps 40 percent of each
group must approve)., If a substantial percentage of a minority ethnic group sup-
ports a particular decision and that decision garners a supermajority, then it is fair to
assume that the reasons offered in support of the decision have been found accept-
able, and the decision itself is regarded as a step in the direction of developing fair
terms of cooperation. In addition, there could, and perhaps should, be a sunset pro-
vision for the minority veto. For example, it could be part of the deal that the issue
of minority veto will be revisited in ten years if a simple majority wishes to recon-
sider the issue. While making it easy to revisit the issue, eliminating the minority
veto should, however, still require approval by a significant number of each ethnic
group that is part of the coalition or the government. For example, it would not be
unreasonable to allow the removal of the minority veto if 60 percent of all members
of the legislative body, including at least 40 percent of members of each ethnic group,
concur. If such large factions of the various groups agree that the minority veto has
outlived its usefulness, then it may be that the deliberative process has in fact made
progress in cultivating comfort among the various groups and interethnic solidarity,
however thin it may remain.
71. This applies in the Northern Ireland agreement. See PELEG,supra note 62, at 155.
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CONCLUSION
Deliberative democracy in plural societies is complex and difficult. It is even
more complex and difficult in societies that are severely divided. Critics will cer-
tainly argue that deliberative democracy generally, and as I have presented it in
this article, is incapable of processing deep difference. However, I have attempted
to show that unlike consociational and incentive-based approaches, the delibera-
tive approach simultaneously acknowledges the importance of those differences
and the fact that they are constituted partly through narratives and discourses,
and consequently could be reconceived or transformed through sustained institu-
tional dialogue among the various groups. In that sense, only deliberative democ-
racy has the capacity to process deep difference. That is so not only because
discourse constructs meaning and the relationship among agents, but also because
those dialogues and discourse will have been institutionally entrenched, thereby
making it possible for the various groups to continue to create and transform their
individual and collective identities and interests. Under this account, accommoda-
tion may in fact lead to a stronger link among the various contending ethnic
groups, one that we may refer to as "pluralistic solidarity."
If one were to label the approach I have presented in this article, it would be
"constructivist." It is constructivist to the extent that it views deliberation as a pro-
cess through which the identities of the participants, not just the policies and in-
stitutions of the polity, are constructed and transformed.
In conclusion, I wish to raise an important issue that I hope to explore further
in subsequent work. Paying close attention to severely fractured societies and to the
establishment of institutions to deal with the problems that such societies face will
be valuable for international legal scholars and legal actors. How we resolve the divi-
sions in those societies may give us some clues as to how best we should devise inter-
national institutions in a globalized world of divided loyalties and identities. In the
same way that groups in severely divided societies are physically close and yet very
far apart in terms of allegiances and loyalties, the globalized world has brought
countries, systems, and civilizations closer to one another (in trade and communica-
tion) without processing the deep differences among them. In the same way that the
hegemonic behavior of the multinational or multiethnic state" is a threat to demo-
cratic governance and long-term stability of the nation-state, hegemonic behavior on
72. For a description of the hegemonic state, see generally id. at 3. "Hegemonic states, by defini-
tion, are committed exclusively to the interests of their dominant ethnic groups." Id. at 60. The hege-
mony may be majoritarian (the hegemony of the major ethnic group) or minority-based, as with
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the international level is a great threat to international stability. This threat exists
because in each case the hegemon seeks to fashion the world around it in its image.
Dealing with fracture at the level of the multinational (multiethnic) state may, there-
fore, give us a sense as to how we might want to deal with fracture at the global or
international level. Identity-based fractures will be with us for a long time. In fact,
they are likely to intensify as the process of globalization itself intensifies.
white minority rule in South Africa. For a very helpful diagrammatic classification of political systems
in severely divided societies, see id. at 79.
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